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“net proceeds.”11 
In 1995, the taxpayer attempted to defer the year-end value 
added payment for 1995 to 1996 (as the taxpayer had done in 
1994 and in each year since becoming a member of MCP “in 
the early 1980s.”12 
Citing the regulations13 and Warren v. United States,14 in 
which a cotton gin acted as taxpayer’s agent in collecting and 
holding the proceeds of cotton sale, the Tax Court held that 
MCP served as taxpayer’s agent for making the corn sales 
and receiving sales income with the only limitations placed 
on taxpayer’s receipt of income being self-imposed. 
Therefore, the limitations were ineffective to achieve a deferral 
for tax purposes with the taxpayer constructively receiving 
the year-end value added payments during the taxable years 
in issue.15 
Possible Solution 
In the 1982 Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case, Busby v. 
United States,16 the sale of a cotton crop on a deferred basis 
was successful in withstanding an IRS challenge where an 
irrevocable escrow account was established by the cotton gin 
with no right by the taxpayer to the funds until the following 
year.17 The deferred payment was the result of an arm’s length 
agreement and was held by the court to shift the income to the 
next year.18 Although there may be resistance to the time and 
possible expense involved with such an irrevocable escrow 
account, and there is always the risk of an IRS challenge, 
particularly in another Court of Appeals area, the irrevocable 
escrow does offer one possible solution. 
FOOTNOTES 
1 Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2.  See generally, 4 Harl, Agricultural 
Law § 25.03[2] (2004); Harl, Agricultural Law Manual  § 
4.01[1][b] (2004). 
2 E.g., Warren v. United States, 613 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1980). 
3
  Scherbart v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2004-143. 
4 Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a). 
5 Id. 
6 Walter v. United States, 148 F.3d 1027 (8th Cir. 1998) (cash 
basis seller of livestock). 
7
  Romine v. Comm’r, 25 T.C. 859 (1956). 
8
  Rev. Rul. 68-44, 1968-1 C.B. 191. 
9 Arnwine v. Comm’r, 696 F.2d 1102 (5th Cir. 1983), rev’g, 
76 T.C. 532 (1981) (cotton gin (acting on seller’s behalf insofar 
as distribution of proceeds of crop sales concerned) received 
proceeds which were income to producer-seller); Williams v. 
United States, 219 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1955) (receipt by agent is 
receipt by principal; escrow arrangement unilateral and not 
product of bona fide arm’s length negotiation); Warren v. United 
States, 613 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1980) (cotton gin acted as 
taxpayer’s agent in collecting and holding proceeds of cotton 
sale); P.R. Farms, Inc. v. Comm’r, 820 F.2d 1084 (9th Cir. 1982), 
aff’g, T.C. Memo. 1984-549 (sale of fruit by agent; proceeds 
includible in taxpayer’s income in year of sale even though not 
remitted to taxpayer until later year). Compare Busby v. United 
States, 679 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1982) (sale of cotton crop on 
deferred basis with irrevocable escrow account established by 
cotton gin with no right by taxpayer to funds until following 
year. 




13 Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a).

14
   613 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1980).

15
  Scherbart v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2004-143.

16




18 Id. See Maurer and Harl, “Using Escrow Accounts and 
Letters of Credit to Assure Payment Under Credit Sales 
Agreements,” 14 J. Agr. Tax & L. 3, 17 (1992). See also Reed 
v. Comm’r, 723 F.2d 138, 145-148 (1st Cir. 1983) (taxable 
income not recognized until funds payable from escrow 
account). 
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES

by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr 
BANKRUPTCY 
GENERAL 
SETOFF. The farm debtor originally filed for Chapter 7 and 
that case was closed and the debtor personally discharged of 
debts, including secured debts owed to the FSA. The creditor 
sought foreclosure of those secured debts but the foreclosure 
was delayed by the debtor’s filing for Chapter 12. The debtor 
was allowed to enroll in federal farm programs post-petition 
and became entitled to payments under those programs. The 
USDA sought a setoff of the farm program payments against 
the secured debts. The court held that, because the debtor was 
relieved of personal liability for the secured debts in the prior 
Chapter 7 case, there existed no mutual personal debts between 
the USDA and the debtor to support a setoff under Section 553(a). 
In re Myers, 362 F.3d 667 (10th Cir. 2004), aff’g, 284 B.R. 
478 (Bankr. 10th Cir. 2002). 
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CHAPTER 12 
ELIGIBILITY. As part of a settlement of federal farm loans, 
the debtor transferred title to the debtor’s farm by deed to the 
FmHA (now the FSA). About five years later, the FSA offered 
to rent the land to the debtor with an option to purchase the 
farm at the end of the lease. The debtor notified the FSA that 
the debtor wanted to exercise the option but the debtor did not 
sign the purchase contract; instead the debtor filed 
administrative appeals over the purchase price and then filed 
for Chapter 12 in an attempt to cramdown the amount to be 
paid under the purchase option. The FSA filed a motion for the 
debtor to assume or reject the option purchase contract and the 
court ordered the debtor to assume or reject the contract. The 
debtor refused to do either action because the debtor argued 
that the debtor had always retained an ownership interest in the 
farm. The court held that the farm was owned by the FSA under 
the voluntary conveyance by the debtor to satisfy the original 
FmHA debts; therefore, because the debtor had allowed the 
option to lapse and refused to assume the option contract, the 
farm was not estate property and the debtor was not eligible for 
Chapter 12. In re Dye, 360 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2004). 
FEDERAL TAX 
DISCHARGE. The debtor was an attorney who had failed 
to pay taxes for 1990 and 1991. The debtor entered into 
negotiations with the IRS for payment and made several offers 
in compromise and was the subject of several levies against the 
taxpayer’s bank accounts and distributions from the law firm. 
However, during this time the debtor established several 
nominal bank accounts in other persons’ names in order to hide 
income from the IRS. Also during this time the debtor continued 
a lavish lifestyle and made payments on retirement funds and 
country club memberships. The court held that the debtors’ 
failure to make payments on the taxes owed when the taxpayer 
received substantial income and the use of the nominal bank 
accounts to hide assets were sufficient actions to demonstrate a 
willful attempt to evade payment of the 1990 and 1991 taxes, 
making the taxes nondischargeable under Section 523(a)(1)(c). 
In re Gardner, 360 F.3d 551 (6th Cir. 2004). 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT. Submitted by Roger A. 
McEowen. In 1994, in an attempt to ease the burdens of the 
Endangered Species Act on private landowners, the Department 
of Commerce and the Department of Interior announced, without 
any prior public notice and comment, the immediate 
implementation of a “No Surprises” policy.  The policy required 
that, upon approval of a habitat conservation plan (HCP), 
landowners would be given assurance that once an incidental 
take permit was approved, even if circumstances subsequently 
changed in a manner that would render the HCP inadequate to 
conserve listed species, additional conservation and mitigation 
requirements which would increase the costs or further restrict 
the use of natural resources beyond the original plan would not 
be imposed. The “no surprises” assurances were incorporated 
in all HCPs approved after August of 1994.  The final rule 
implementing the “no surprises” policy provided that “no 
additional land use restrictions or financial compensation will 
be required of the permit holder (without the permittee’s 
consent) with respect to species covered by the permit, even if 
unforeseen circumstances arise after a permit is issued indicating 
that additional mitigation is needed for a given species covered 
by a permit.” 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.22; 17.32. Even if foreseeable 
changed circumstances arise, the rule prohibits the federal 
government from requiring any conservation and mitigation 
measures in addition to those provided for in an HCP unless 
the HCP specifically authorizes imposition of such additional 
requirements, even where “additional conservation and 
mitigation measures are deemed to be necessary to conserve a 
species.” In addition, HCPs are not required to authorize 
additional measures designed to address foreseeable changes 
in circumstances. Also, the rule does not require the agencies 
responsible for administering the ESA to take any specific 
remedial actions when, based on “unforeseen circumstances” 
or foreseeable “changed circumstances” not provided for by an 
HCP, activities undertaken pursuant to an incidental take permit 
place a listed species in danger of extinction or significantly 
impaired recovery.  In 1999, the Fish and Wildlife Service 
promulgated a permit revocation rule incorporating the “no 
surprises” rule, and also promulgated a second rule exempting 
incidental take permits from the general permit revocation 
regulations. The general permit revocation regulations authorize 
revocation of any FWS permit when “populations of the wildlife 
or plant that is the subject of the permit declines to the extent 
that continuation of the permitted activity would be detrimental 
to maintenance or recovery of the affected population.”  In late 
2003, however, the United States District Court for the District 
of Columbia ruled that both the “no surprises” rule and the 
“permit revocation” rule were invalid as having been 
promulgated in violation of the notice and comment 
requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act.  Spirit of 
the Sage Council, et al. v. Norton, 294 F. Supp. 2d 67 (D. D.C. 
2003). In 2004, the court ordered that all incidental take permits 
issued by the FWS are subject to the general revocation standard 
applicable to other FWS permits until such time that the FWS 
adopts new revocation rules for incidental take permits in 
compliance with the notice and comment requirements of the 
APA. Until that time, no new incidental take permits can be 
issued that contain the “no surprises” assurances. Spirit of the 
Sage Council, et al. v. Norton, No. 98-1873 (EGS), 2004 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 10789 (D. D.C. Jun. 10, 2004). 
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL 
PROGRAMS 
ANIMAL VACCINATIONS. The plaintiffs owned 
racehorses which were treated with vaccines manufactured by 
the defendant. The plaintiffs alleged that the vaccines injured 
the horses and brought suit in state court for negligence, strict 
liability, breach of implied and express warranty. The defendant 
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moved the case to federal court and the court sua sponte reviewed 
its proper jurisdiction over the case. The defendant argued that 
the case was governed by the Virus, Serums, Toxins, Antitoxins 
and Analogous Products Act, 21 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. which 
preempted all state law claims and created a federal question to 
support federal jurisdiction over the case. The court noted that 
all the claims were brought under state law and that the plaintiffs 
made no mention of violation or enforcement of federal law or 
regulations. The court held that the federal law and regulations 
did not provide “complete preemption” of all claims involving 
animal vaccines but provided only “conflict preemption” for 
claims which conflicted with the federal regulatory scheme. 
Therefore, because the court could not say that all of the claims 
were preempted by the federal law, the case was remanded to 
state court for trial. Arnold v. Intervet, Inc., 305 F. Supp.2d 
548 (D. Md. 2003). 
CONSERVATION SECURITY PROGRAM. The CCC has 
issued interim regulations for administering the Conservation 
Security Program which provides financial and technical 
assistance to agricultural producers who, in accordance with 
certain requirements, conserve and improve the quality of soil, 
water, air, energy, plant and animal life, and support other 
conservation activities. 69 Fed. Reg. 34501 (June 21, 2004). 
LIVESTOCK IDENTIFICATION PROGRAM. The 
APHIS has announced that the Under Secretary for Marketing 
and Regulatory Programs, U.S. Department of Agriculture, will 
host a series of listening sessions to provide livestock producers 
and other stakeholders with the opportunity to offer their 
comments regarding the Department’s implementation of a 
National Animal Identification System. The public meetings will 
be held in Prineville, OR on July 1, 2004; in Stockton, CA on 
July 10, 2004; in Socorro, NM on July 16, 2004; in Pasco, WA 
on July 23, 2004; in Greeley, CO on August 10, 2004; in Billings, 
MT on August 13, 2004; in Kissimmee, FL on August 16, 2004; 
in Columbus, OH on August 18, 2004; in Ames, IA on August 
26, 2004; in Joplin, MO on August 27, 2004; in Appleton, WI on 
August 30, 2004; and in St. Cloud, MN on August 31, 2004. 69 
Fed. Reg. 35575 (June 25, 2004). 
PERISHABLE AGRICULTURALCOMMODITIES ACT. 
The plaintiffs had filed PACA trust claims against the defendant 
produce dealer. The plaintiffs’ claims included interest and 
attorneys’ fees which were provided for on the invoices originally 
submitted for payment for the produce. The trial court denied 
the claims for interest and attorneys’ fees because the allowance 
of the extra amounts would result in a disproportionate 
distribution of the PACA trust funds. The appellate court reversed 
and held that the interest and attorneys’ fees provided by the 
invoices were recoverable from the PACA trust funds. The court 
examined the statute, 7 U.S.C. § 499e(c)(2), which allowed claims 
for “full payment of the sums owing in connection with 
[commodities] transactions.” The court held that this language 
did not exclude expenses also bargained for by the parties. 
Country Best v. Manning, 361 F.3d 629 (11th Cir. 2004). 
The debtor operated a factoring business which purchased the 
accounts receivable of a PACA licensed produce handler. The 
handler’s cash flow deteriorated and the debtor was forced to 
provide loans to the handler in order to protect the value of the 
accounts receivable. As part of the loan process, the debtor 
became involved in the finances of the handler, sought 
additional investors in the handler and took control of the 
accounting and stock of the handler. However, the debtor did 
not become an officer or director of the handler nor did the 
debtor control the day-to-day business operations of the 
handler. Unpaid produce sellers sought to make the debtor 
personally liable for the PACA trust obligations of the handler. 
In addition, the sellers sought to have the amounts owed by 
debtor under PACA declared nondischargeable in the debtor’s 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy case for breach of fiduciary duty. The 
court held that the sellers failed to prove that the debtor’s 
involvement was sufficient to apply PACA trust liability to 
the debtor. The court held that the evidence did not show that 
the debtor had actual or assumed legal responsibility for the 
handler’s actions but showed only that the debtor attempted to 
maintain the financial health of the handler long enough to 
protect the accounts receivable purchased from the handler. 
Because the debtor did not have any fiduciary responsibility 
under the PACA trust, any debts owed to the sellers were not 
nondischargeable for breach of fiduciary duty. The court also 
noted that the sellers failed to provide evidence of any breach 
or impropriety by the debtor in handling the handler’s financial 
affairs. In re Steinberg, 307 B.R. 310 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2004). 
FEDERAL ESTATE 
AND GIFT TAXATION 
FAMILY-OWNED BUSINESS DEDUCTION. The 
decedent’s estate failed to file its Form 706 with the family-
owned business deduction election, although the tax return 
preparer had been instructed to make the election. The IRS 
granted the estate an extension of time to file an amended return 
with the FOBD election. Ltr. Rul. 200425034, March 4, 2004. 
RECIPROCAL TRUSTS. The taxpayers, husband and 
wife, each established an irrevocable trust for the benefit of 
the other taxpayer, funded with cash and insurance policies. 
The reminder interests in both trusts passed to the taxpayers’ 
children. The trusts were generally identical except the 
husband’s trust provided that the wife had the right to withdraw 
specified amounts of trust principal after one child’s death. 
The husband’s trust also granted to the wife an inter vivos 
special power, effective at the child’s death, to appoint trust 
principal among any of the husband’s issue and their spouses 
or any trust created primarily for the benefit of one or more of 
those persons. Further, to the extent the wife did not exercise 
her inter vivos special power, the husband’s trust granted to 
the wife an inter vivos or testamentary special power, effective 
at the child’s death, to appoint trust principal among any of 
the husband’s issue and any charities the wife designated or 
any trust created primarily for the benefit of one or more of 
those persons. Finally, if a marital trust is established, the 
husband’s trust granted to the wife a testamentary special power 
to appoint the assets remaining in the marital trust among any 
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of the husband’s issue and any charities the wife designated or 
any trust created primarily for the benefit of one or more of 
those persons. Under the wife’s trust, with respect to any trust 
established under the wife’s trust except a marital trust, the 
husband could not be a beneficiary until three years after the 
wife’s death and then will only be a beneficiary at any time 
when his net worth is under a certain amount and his income 
from personal services is under a certain amount. Distributions 
to the husband under this provision were limited to an amount 
reduced by the husband’s income from personal services during 
the calendar year of the distribution. The IRS ruled that the 
provisions unique to each trust were sufficient to prevent the 
trusts from being deemed reciprocal to as to include the trust 
property in the grantor’s estate. Ltr. Rul. 200426008, March 
10, 2004. 
TRUSTS. Prior to September 25, 1985, an irrevocable trust 
was established and funded for the grantor’s three children. No 
contributions to the trust were made after the trust was 
established. Each beneficiary’s portion of the trust was teated 
as a separate trust. The remainder of each child’s trust passed 
either by a special power of appointment held by the beneficiary 
or to the issue of the child. The trust obtained a ruling by a state 
probate court for the separation of the trust into three distinct 
trusts, with a pro rata distribution of the original trust property 
equally among the three trusts. The IRS ruled that the division 
of the trust into the three trusts did not cause the trusts to be 
subject to GST. Ltr. Rul. 200426005, March 22, 2004. 
FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION 
BUSINESS USE OF RESIDENCE. The taxpayers, husband 
and wife, purchased a house in a ski resort area and initially 
rented the house through a management company when they 
were not using the house. In the tax years involved, the house 
was rented only to persons known by the taxpayers for a rent 
less than fair market rental value. The court held that, because 
the house was rented below fair market rental, under I.R.C. § 
280A, the rental was considered personal use and the taxpayers 
were limited to deductions which did not exceed income from 
the property. In the second tax year, the rent was above fair 
market rent and the rental periods exceeded 14 days or 10 percent 
of the personal use by the taxpayers; therefore, Section 280A 
did not apply but the deductions were limited by I.R.C. § 183(a) 
because the taxpayers did not own the property with an intent to 
make a profit. The court found that the property was held by the 
taxpayers primarily for investment purposes because they did 
not actively market the property, keep full records of the rental 
activity, charge full market rent and received personal use of 
the property. Thus, the court held that the property was held for 
two purposes, as a residential rental property business and for 
investment. The court held that the expenses had to be rationally 
allocated between the two uses with the deductions limited to 
the income from each use. Rivera v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary 
Op. 2004-81. 
CONSERVATION EASEMENTS. The IRS has issued a 
warning that the IRS may disallow charitable contribution 
deductions for participation in two types of transactions: (1) 
transfers of easements on real property to charitable organizations, 
and (2) payments to charitable organizations in connection with a 
purchase of real property from the charitable organization.  In the 
case of easement transfers, the IRS may disallow deductions for 
failure to comply with the I.R.C. § 170 substantiation 
requirements. The IRS announced that they are considering 
changes to forms to facilitate compliance with and enforcement 
of the requirements. If inappropriate charitable deductions are 
made for cash payments or easement transfers in connection with 
a taxpayer’s purchase of real property, the IRS may treat the total 
of the buyer’s payments to the charitable organization as the 
purchase price paid by the buyer for the property. In addition, the 
IRS may impose failure to file penalties under I.R.C. § 6652, 
excess benefit transaction penalties under I.R.C. § 4958, and 
penalties against promoters and appraisers under I.R.C. §§ 6700, 
6701 and 6694. Further, the IRS may challenge the tax-exempt 
status of an organization, based on the organization’s operation 
for a substantial nonexempt purpose or impermissible private 
benefit. Notice 2004-41, I.R.B. 2004-27. 
DEPRECIATION. The IRS has adopted as final regulations 
which exclude from the definition of passenger automobile any 
truck or van that is a qualified nonpersonal use vehicle as defined 
in Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5T(k). Qualified nonpersonal use vehicles 
include not only the trucks and vans listed in Treas. Reg. §  1.274­
5T(k)(2), but also trucks and vans described in Treas. Reg. § 1.274­
5T(k)(7) (relating to trucks and vans that have been specially 
modified, such as by installation of permanent shelving and 
painting the vehicle to display advertising or the company’s name, 
so that they are not likely to be used more than a de minimis 
amount for personal purposes). These specially manufactured or 
modified vehicles do not provide significant elements of personal 
benefit, and a taxpayer is unlikely to purchase these vehicles unless 
motivated by a valid business purpose that could not be met with 
a less-expensive vehicle. The IRS also noted that future revenue 
procedures providing the depreciation limits for passenger vehicles 
will provide higher limits for light trucks and vans because these 
vehicles have a higher price inflation rate. 69 Fed. Reg. 35513 
(June 25, 2004). 
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS. The taxpayer was a 
general partner in a partnership which operated a continuing care 
facility. The partnership obtained loans which were personally 
guaranteed by the taxpayer. The partnership filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy but filed a liquidation plan. The bankruptcy trustee 
negotiated a settlement with the partnership creditors under which 
the partners provided contributions to the bankruptcy estate to 
help pay creditors’ claims and the creditors accepted less than 
full payment. The Bankruptcy Court granted the partnership and 
partners, including the taxpayer, a discharge for all partnership 
debts. The Bankruptcy Court claimed jurisdiction over the 
taxpayer as part of its discharge order. The partnership Form K-1 
for the tax year of discharge allocated a portion of the discharged 
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obligations to the taxpayer as discharge of indebtedness income. 
The taxpayer argued that  the discharge of indebtedness income 
was not taxable, under I.R.C. § 108(d)(2), because the discharge 
occurred as part of a bankruptcy case. The Tax Court agreed and 
held that the discharge of indebtedness income was excluded 
from gross income. Gracia v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2004-147; 
Mirarchi v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2004-148; Price v. Comm’r, 
T.C. Memo. 2004-149; Martinez v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 
2004-150. 
DISASTER LOSSES. On June 18, 2004, the President 
determined that certain areas in Wisconsin were eligible for 
assistance under the Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 
Act (42 USC 5121) as a result of severe storms and flooding, 
which began on May 19, 2004. FEMA-1526-DR. On June 18, 
2004, the President determined that certain areas in Kentucky 
were eligible for assistance under the Act as a result of tornadoes, 
flooding, severe storms and flooding, which began on May 26, 
2004. FEMA-1523-DR. On June 11, 2004, the President 
determined that certain areas in Missouri were eligible for 
assistance from the government under the Act as a result of severe 
storms, tornadoes, and flooding that began on May 18, 2004. 
FEMA-1524-DR. On June 15, 2004, the President determined 
that certain areas in Virginia were eligible for assistance from 
the government under the Act as a result of severe storms, 
tornadoes, and flooding that began on May 24, 2004. FEMA­
1525-DR. On June 8, 2004, the President determined that certain 
areas in Louisiana were eligible for assistance from the 
government under the Act as a result of severe storms and 
flooding that began on May 12, 2004. FEMA-1521-DR. 
Accordingly, taxpayers in the affected areas who sustained losses 
may deduct them on their 2003 federal income tax returns. 
HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNT. The IRS has provided 
relief for taxpayers in states which require health insurance plans 
without a deductible or with a deductible amount less than that 
required for a “high deductible health plan” as required for the 
federal HSAs. The IRS stated that low deductible plans will be 
treated as qualifying under I.R.C. § 223(c)(2) if the only reason 
the plans are not HDHPs is because of state-mandated benefits. 
Notice 2004-43, I.R.B. 2004-27. 
IRA. The decedent died owning an interest in an IRA which 
had the surviving spouse taxpayer as the beneficiary. After the 
death of the decedent, the company maintaining the IRA 
transferred the funds to a money market account in the name of 
the taxpayer. The taxpayer was unable to get immediate tax advice 
as to the IRA but when the taxpayer received advice, the advice 
was incorrect that the 60 day rollover period had expired. By the 
time the taxpayer received correct advice, the 60-day period had 
expired and the taxpayer sought a waiver of the 60-day period in 
order to rollover the funds to an IRA without tax. The IRS granted 
the waiver. Ltr. Rul. 200425049,  March 22, 2004. 
RETURNS. The IRS has released on its website, at 
www.irs.gov/charities/index.html, previews of two new 
publications: IRS Publication 4302, A Charity’s Guide to Car 
Donations, and IRS Publication 4304, A Donor’s Guide to Car 
Donations. 
S CORPORATIONS 
BUILT-IN GAIN. Under the current rules, (Treas. Reg. §§ 
1.337(d)-4 through 1.337(d)-7, 1.1374-1 through 1.1374-10) if 
an owner C corporation, elects to be an S corporation when it 
owns all of the stock of another C corporation, the net unrealized 
built-in gain (NUBIG) will reflect the built-in gain or built-in 
loss in the other C corporation’s stock. That built-in gain or built-
in loss may be duplicative of the built-in gain or built-in loss in 
the other C corporation’s assets. If the other C corporation later 
transfers its assets to the owning C corporation in a liquidation 
to which I.R.C. §§ 332 and 337(a) apply, the built-in gain and 
built-in loss in the other C corporation’s assets may be reflected 
twice: once in the NUBIG attributable to the assets the S 
corporation owned on the date of its conversion (including the 
stock of the other C corporation) and a second time in the NUBIG 
attributable to other C corporation’s former assets acquired by 
the S corporation in the liquidation of the other C corporation. A 
similar result would obtain if, on the date of its conversion to an 
S corporation, the owner C corporation owned less than 80 
percent of the stock of the other C corporation and later acquired 
the assets of the other C corporation in a reorganization to which 
I.R.C. § 368(a) applies. The IRS has issued proposed regulations 
which adjust (increase or decrease) the NUBIG of the pool of 
assets that included the stock of the liquidated or acquired C 
corporation to reflect the extent to which the built-in gain or 
built-in loss inherent in the redeemed or canceled C corporation 
stock at the time the pool of assets became subject to the tax 
under I.R.C. § 1374 has been eliminated from the corporate tax 
system in the liquidation or reorganization. The proposed 
regulations provide that, if I.R.C. § 1374(d)(8) applies to an S 
corporation’s acquisition of assets, some or all of the stock of 
the corporation from which such assets were acquired was taken 
into account in the computation of NUBIG for a pool of assets 
of the S corporation, and some or all of such stock is redeemed 
or canceled in such transaction, subject to certain limitations, 
the NUBIG of the pool of assets that included the C corporation 
stock redeemed or canceled in the transaction (other than stock 
with respect to which a loss under I.R.C. § 165 is claimed) is 
adjusted to eliminate any effect any built-in gain or built-in loss 
in the redeemed or canceled C corporation stock had on the initial 
computation of NUBIG for that pool of assets. For this purpose, 
stock that has an adjusted basis that is determined (in whole or 
in part) by reference to the adjusted basis of any other asset held 
by the S corporation as of the first day of the recognition period 
(i.e., stock described in I.R.C. § 1374(d)(6)) is treated as taken 
into account in the computation of the NUBIG for the pool of 
assets of the S corporation. Adjustments to NUBIG under the 
proposed regulations, however, are subject to two limitations. 
First, the NUBIG is only adjusted to reflect the amount of the 
built-in gain or built-in loss that was inherent in the redeemed or 
canceled stock at the time the pool of assets became subject to 
tax under I.R.C. § 1374 that has not resulted in recognized built-
in gain or recognized built-in loss at any time during the 
recognition period, including on the date of the acquisition to 
which I.R.C. § 1374(d)(8) applies. Second, an adjustment cannot 
be made if it is duplicative of another adjustment to the NUBIG 
for a pool of assets. This rule is intended to prevent more than 
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one adjustment to the NUBIG of a pool of assets for the same 
built-in gain or built-in loss stock. Any adjustment to NUBIG 
under these proposed rules will only affect computations of the 
amount subject to tax under I.R.C. § 1374 for taxable years 
that end on or after the date of the liquidation or reorganization. 
It will not affect computations of the amount subject to tax under 
I.R.C. § 1374 for taxable years that end before the date of the 
liquidation or reorganization. 69 Fed. Reg. 35544 (June 25, 
2004). 
TAX SCHEMES. The IRS has issued a warning that some 
tax schemes involving the U.S. Virgin Islands are tax avoidance 
schemes and the claimed tax effects will be ignored. The tax 
schemes purport to allow U.S. residents to take advantage of a 
reduction for USVI income tax rates which were allowed as an 
incentive for investments in USVI corporations. The tax 
schemes represent that (1) a person can continue to live and 
work in the United States and, nevertheless, be a bona fide 
resident of the USVI; (2) USVI source income includes income 
from services performed in the United States; (3) for purposes 
of determining the source of income, USVI includes the U.S.; 
and (4) non-USVI source income can be legitimately connected 
with the conduct of a trade or business within the USVI even if 
equivalent income would not be considered effectively 
connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the 
U.S. Notice 2004-45, I.R.B. 2004-27. 
NEGLIGENCE 
IRRIGATION SYSTEM. Submitted by Roger A. 
McEowen. The plaintiff expanded its farming operation to 
include leased land on which the defendant operated a gas well. 
The plaintiff notified the defendant that a compressor shed 
located near the well was in the path of a circle pivot irrigation 
system. The defendant remedied the problem by constructing 
a cement bag ramp to allow the irrigation system to clear the 
oil and gas structures. Shortly thereafter, the irrigation system 
collapsed, rendering it non-functional and leaving the plaintiff’s 
corn crop without water for a week. The plaintiff sued the 
defendant for negligent design, construction and placement of 
the ramp. The trial court found the defendant 100 percent at 
fault, awarding damages at $75,717. On appeal, however, the 
appellate court ordered a new trial on the basis that the trial 
court improperly excluded evidence of the defendant’s 
experience with similar irrigation ramps and disallowed expert 
witness testimony.  The court specifically noted that the 
mechanical operation of farm equipment is not an area of general 
knowledge for juries. Norton Farms, Inc. v. Anadarko 
Petroleum Corporation, No. 90,820, 2004 Kan. App. LEXIS 
610 (Kan. Ct. App. Jun. 25, 2004). 
NUISANCE 
HOG CONFINEMENT FACILITY. The defendants owned 
and operated ten hog confinement facilities at different 
locations. The facilities were all constructed and began operation 
more than one year before the suit was filed by 68 plaintiffs 
who were neighbors of one or more facilities. The plaintiffs 
filed suit in nuisance for injunctive relief and compensatory 
and punitive damages. The defendant sought a summary 
judgment and argued that Miss. Code § 95-3-29 prohibited the 
suit because it was not brought within one year of the beginning 
operation of the facilities and the facilities had not been 
substantially changed since their inception. The plaintiffs argued 
that seven of the facilities had, within one year before the suit, 
constructed animal carcass incinerators on the facilities which 
substantially changed the operations. The plaintiffs also argued 
that the facilities violated the Mississippi Air and Water Pollution 
Control Law (MAWPCL) which was not subject to the one year 
limitation. The court held that, if the construction of the 
incinerators was a substantial change in the operation of the 
hog facilities (the court did not rule on this issue), the suit would 
be allowed only as to the incinerators and not as to the entire 
facilities. The court also held that an issue of fact remained as 
to whether the MAWPCL provided a private right of action to 
enforce its provisions and whether the facilities violated any 
provision. Because the defendant had not shown that the 
defendant was entitled to summary judgment on all issues, the 
court denied the motion. In re Moore, 306 B.R. 849 (Bankr. 
N.D. Miss. 2004). 
PROPERTY 
RAILROAD RIGHT-OF-WAY. Submitted by Roger A. 
McEowen. A railroad was conveyed a fee simple interest in a 
tract of land in the late 1800s. The railroad eventually 
abandoned the rail line and later transferred by quitclaim deed 
the land to the defendant school district. The school district 
hired a third party to remove fill dirt from the tract to backfill a 
hole on other school property, and the plaintiffs, as adjacent 
landowners, sued for trespass. The plaintiffs claimed that they 
owned the tract at issue because the railroad only held an 
easement which reverted to them upon abandonment of the rail 
line. The trial court agreed, based on a 1905 Kansas Supreme 
Court case holding that a railroad cannot obtain a fee simple 
interest in land to be used for right-of-way purposes. On appeal, 
the court reversed. The appellate court noted that Kan. Stat. 
Ann. § 66-501 allows railroads to acquire land in fee simple 
absolute and that prior Kansas caselaw has held that fee title is 
conveyed where the deed does not contain use limitations, 
irrespective of the size of the tract. The court distinguished the 
1905 case on the basis that the court, in that case, was dealing 
with an ambiguous deed (concerning the interest conveyed) that 
was eventually construed through the use of extrinsic evidence 
to convey a right-of-way.  In the present case, however, the 
court noted that the deed was not subject to any use restrictions 
or a reversion clause. As such, the railroad held a fee interest 
that it had been conveyed to the school district. Stone v. U.S.D. 
No. 222, No. 90,317, 2004 Kan. LEXIS 409 (Kan. Sup. Ct. 
Jun. 25, 2004). 
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STATE TAXATION

AGRICULTURAL USE. The plaintiff had petitioned the 
Minnesota Tax Court for review of a county appraisal of the 
plaintiff’s rural land. The plaintiff argued that the land was 
eligible for taxation as “green acre” valuation at use value. The 
plaintiff refused the county’s settlement offer and the Tax Court 
ruled in the plaintiff’s favor. The plaintiff filed a motion for 
court costs and disbursements more than 90 days after the Tax 
Court’s final order. The Tax court denied the plaintiff’s motion 
for court costs because the motion was not filed within 90 days 
after the final order. The appellate court affirmed the Tax Court 
and held that the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
allowed a longer time for post-order motions, did not apply to 
the Tax Court because the Tax Court had its own rule for filings 
of motions. Raisanen v. County of Hennepin, 678 N.W.2d 
669 (Minn. 2004), aff’g, 2003 Minn. Tax LEXIS 12 (Minn. 
T.C., Apr. 11, 2003). 
CITATION UPDATES

In re Barranco, 307 B.R. 539 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2004) 
(bankruptcy discharge of taxes) see p. 99 supra. 
Keller v. Bolding, 678 N.W.2d 578 (N.D. 2004) (lease 
termination) see p. 70 supra. 
T.R. Incorp. of Ashland, Kansas v. Brandon, 87 P.3d 331 
(Kan. Ct. App. 2004) (lease term) see p. 63 supra. 
IN THE NEWS

PATENTS-SAVED SEED. On Jun. 25, 2004, Rep. Marcy 
Kaptur (D-OH) introduced into the U.S. House the Seed 
Availability and Competition Act of 2004.  The bill would 
decriminalize the act of saving patented seed as long as a producer 
reports the quantity and type of seed retained and pays a techical 
fee to the USDA. The USDA will then compensate the patent 
holders. H.R. 4693. 
AGRICULTURAL TAX AND LAW SEMINARS

by Neil E. Harl and Roger A. McEowen 
August 24-27, 2004 Interstate Holiday Inn, Grand Island, NE 
Come join us for expert and practical seminars on the essential aspects of agricultural tax and law. Gain insight and understanding 
from two of the nation’s top agricultural tax and law instructors. 
The seminars are held on Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday. Registrants may attend one, two, three or all four days, with 
separate pricing for each combination. On Tuesday, Dr. Harl will speak about farm and ranch income tax. On Wednesday, Dr. Harl will 
cover farm and ranch estate planning. On Thursday, Roger McEowen will cover farm and ranch business planning. On Friday, Roger 
McEowen will cover agricultural commercial and property law with taxation. Your registration fee includes comprehensive annotated 
seminar materials for the days attended and lunch. 
The seminar registration fees for current subscribers to the Agricultural Law Digest, the Agricultural Law Manual, or Principles of 
Agricultural Law (and for each one of multiple registrations from one firm) are $185 (one day), $360 (two days), $525 (three days), and 
$670(four days). 
The registration fees for nonsubscribers are $200, $390, $570 and $720, respectively. 
All Digest subscribers will receive a brochure in the mail soon. Full information is also available online at http://www.agrilawpress.com 
Contact Robert Achenbach at 541-302-1958, e-mail Robert@agrilawpress.com 
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